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ESSAY
WARDS COVE PACKING OR NOT WARDS COVE PACKING?
THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION: SOME THOUGHTS ON
IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Mack A Player*
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE: THE THESIS
Assume two employers, A and B. Each gives a separate objec-
tive test to select employees for a particular position. Employer
A utilizes a pen-and-paper, multiple choice examination that
has questions in three major categories: 1) biology and genetics
which includes DNA theory, cloning, etc.; 2) astrophysics, with
questions about time, space, light relationships, "black holes,"
novas, etc. and 3) microprocessor engineering, the internet, sili-
con chips, and the like.
Employer B utilizes a physical performance test that has
three components: 1) strength and stamina including ifting
dead weights, carrying weights, and running long distances; 2)
speed and agility that includes running short distances for
speed, navigating an obstacle course and performing tasks in
narrow or tight places, and 3) coordination that involves hand-
eye skills, reaction times, etc.
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Assume that the scientific knowledge test given by employer
A was evaluated in terms of passage rates by racial group.
Those who were white passed at a 60% rate. Hypothetically, a
particular ethnic group passed at a 35% rate. The test has an
adverse impact on the group who passed at the lower rate.'
Since Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2 Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act has been construed to impose on employer A the
obligation to prove the "business necessity" of this selection
device.' The proven adverse impact of the selection device on
the protected class shifts the burden to the employer to prove
that the test is 'Job related and consistent with business ne-
cessity."4 Failure of employer A to establish the "job related-
1. "A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-
fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
fifths rate will generally not be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact." 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1996).
Applying this standard, a selection rate on the test for the non-white group of
less than 48% would be "evidence" of adverse impact. While such a measure may not
be mathematically sound, see, Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment
Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L.REV. 793 (1978), the wide dif-
ference between a 60% pass rate for whites and a 35% pass rate for the other ethnic
group probably has statistical significance in that the difference is sufficiently great
that chance as an hypothesis for the observed difference could be discounted mathe-
matically to a high level of confidence.
For a more complete discussion see, Mack A. Player, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAw 362-67 (1988); D Baldus & J. Cole, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
(1989).
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. See, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). As long as no single component
of the testing mechanism disqualified the applicant from being considered or taking
other components of the test, the employer probably need not validate each compo-
nent. Rather, the employer would be required to prove that the test as a whole mea-
sured or predicted job performance.
4. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994). This "definition" was added to Title VII by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Consequently, impact analysis created by Griggs has
been codified. The precise meaning of 'job related" and "business necessity" have
never been defined with any precision. Early cases emphasized the "business necessi-
ty" aspect of the definition. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), for
example, required precise expert validation of testing devices proving the predictive
validity of the devices, utilizing the term "manifest relationship." Two years later the
Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), emphatically required "business
necessity" by requiring the employer to show that the challenged practice was neces-
sary to safe and efficient job performance. Later decisions seemed to lean toward a
relaxed form of 'job relatedness." The courts look toward "legitimate employer goals"
that were "significantly served by" the challenged device. See New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977 (1988). I have previously reviewed this authority. See Mack A. Player, Is Griggs
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ness/business necessity" of this test, would result in Title VII
liability. A plaintiff from the disadvantaged class would win,
even though the employer may have acted in good faith with no
racial motivation in adopting or utilizing the test.5
Assume that the physical test of employer B is evaluated for
its impact on the two genders, and that this evaluation demon-
strates that 75% of the men who take the test pass, but only
55% of the female test-takers are successful. This difference in
passage rates between genders would seem to establish the ad-
verse impact of the test on women.' First, note that the impact
analysis pioneered by Griggs v. Duke Power for race discrimina-
tion is applicable to gender.! Title VII analysis of neutral selec-
tion devices are applicable to all classes protected by Title VII
(i.e., race, color, sex, national origin and religion). As the physi-
cal test has been proved to have an adverse impact on women,
the burden shifts to the employer to prove the "job related-
ness/business necessity" of the device. The employer's failure to
carry this burden will result in a judgment for a female plain-
tiff excluded by virtue of the device. Again, even if the test was
adopted and applied in good faith, the exclusion of women who
fail a test not justified by the 'job relatedness/business necessi-
ty" standard is "sex" discrimination within the meaning of Title
VII.
Dean? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FL. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 16-26, 33-36 (1989).
5. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. ... [B]ut good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as 'built in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to mea-
suring job capability. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
6. See supra, note 1. While the difference between the 75% passage rate of
males and 55% passage rate of females is closer, the rate is still less than 4/5 of the
passage rate of the males, and thus applying the EEOC guideline, the difference is
evidence of impact. The more precise statistical evaluation suggested by Professor
Shoben in note 1 would require knowing the number of persons involved in the se-
lection process. Engaging in such a calculation is beyond the scope of this essay. So,
we should just assume that such a difference proves the impact of the test as envi-
sioned by Griggs.
7. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight require-
ments); Legault v. Arusso, 842 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.H. 1994) (recent illustration of
Griggs being applied to women who disproportionately fail to pass a physical perfor-
mance selection device).
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Now assume the same two employers utilize the same two
tests, but this time the tests are analyzed for their effect on the
protected age class. On the scientific knowledge test, simply
change "white" to "persons under age forty" and "minority" to
"persons over age forty." Assume that the difference in the re-
spective passage rates on the test are the same as when ap-
plied to whites and to an ethnic minority. That is, when ana-
lyzed for impact on age groups, persons under age forty passed
at a 60% rate, and those over age forty passed at a lower 35%
rate. On the physical abilities test given by employer B, change
"men" to "persons under age forty" and "women" to "persons
over age forty." Here again, the outcome is that older persons
are performing at a significantly lower level than persons under
age forty. The threshold question in both cases is whether the
fundamental analysis of Griggs v. Duke Power should be ap-
plied? That is, absent evidence of age motivation, would the
employer be required under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA)5 to justify the use of these "built in
headwinds" for older workers?9
If the ADEA does not embrace the concept of impact analysis,
absent age motivation presented and proven by the plaintiff,
challenges to the tests, regardless of the their irrationality,
must be dismissed. On the other hand, if the ADEA does envi-
sion the concept of impact analysis, the impact of the systems
on older workers, would require that the employer justify the
use of the exclusionary tests.
Assuming the answer to the above question is affirmative,
the next issue, and one that has tended to be ignored by courts
and commentators, is the nature of the employer's burden.
I suggest that 1) impact analysis should be utilized under the
ADEA; that is, violations of the ADEA can be established solely
through the unjustified impact of devices on employment oppor-
8. 29 U.S.C. 621-634 (1994).
9. If one really wants to test for whether the ADEA should encompass impact
analysis, assume that the differential impact was even greater when applied to older
workers. On the scientific knowledge test assume that only 5% of those over 40
passed the test, but 75% of those under 40 were successful. What if the physical test
produced a similarly stark difference. Should not an "an inexorable zero" of older
workers qualifying raise doubt about construing the ADEA to require motive as the
sole source of liability?
[Vol. 31:819822
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tunities on those in the protected "over forty" class, but that 2)
the employer's burden may be somewhat different from the
"business necessity" obligation imposed by Title VII. °
H. THE CONTEXT: HAzEN PAPER Co. V. BIGGINS"
WHAT WAS, AND WAS NOT, DECIDED
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
impact analysis developed by and after Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.' is applicable to the ADEA. Most courts of appeal prior to
1993, either in dicta, holding or assumption, recognized that the
impact concept was appropriate under the ADEA and have
applied standards similar to those developed under Title VII. 3
On its face, the 1993 Supreme Court decision in Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins,'4 did not directly challenge the existing consen-
sus, but resurrected what had become almost a closed issue.
The facts of Hazen Paper are simple. A sixty-two year old em-
ployee who had been working at Hazen Paper Company for
nearly ten years was dismissed. The pension plan provided by
the employer provided for vesting upon ten years of service. In
addition to this coincidence between the timing of the
employee's discharge and the date of the employee's pension
vesting, there was some additional evidence that the employer
was trying to avoid the cost associated with pension vesting,
and evidence that the articulated reason for the plaintiff's dis-
10. I once wrote a brief comment entitled "Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?" in 14 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1261 (1983). Therein, I reached essentially the same conclusion that I
reach today.
11. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. The first court of appeals to apply impact analysis to the ADEA was Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d ir. 1980). The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits soon fol-
lowed. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983);
Allison v. Western Union Tel., 680 F.2d 1319 (l1th Cir. 1982). Other courts accepted
this analysis or assumed that it was valid. See EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers, 998
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1992); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161 (7th
Cir. 1992); Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1991); MacNamara v.
Korean Airlines, 836 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36
(1st Cir. 1986). The EEOC embraces the concept of impact analysis. See 29 C.F.R. §
1602.2 (1996).
14. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
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charge was pretextual. Accepting a finding of fact that plaintiff
Biggins was dismissed to avoid vesting his pension, but without
wrestling with the evidence of age motivation, the lower court
concluded that plaintiff had established illegal age motivation.
The lower court's reasoning was quite logical:
1) Pension vesting (PV) = passage of time (T)
2) Human age (A) = passage of time (T)
3) Therefore, PV (pension vesting) = A (age)
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed: "[A]ge and years
of service are analytically distinct * * * and it is incorrect to
say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily age
based.""5 Thus, motivation to avoid pension vesting is not nec-
essarily discrimination based on the employee's chronological
age, even though both are premised on a common concept, the
passage of time. One might contest the Court's logic, but the
Court has spoken, so we shall live with it. 6
The Court expressed four significant disclaimers to its hold-
ing followed by a reservation:
1) Dismissal of an employee to avoid pension vesting or costs
will violate ERISA. 7
2) If an employee's age was a premise behind the pension
dismissal, this would be illegal "age" discrimination under the
ADEA18
3) If the employer was motivated both by the employee's age
and by possible pension vesting, this would be subjected to dual
motivation analysis of Price Waterhouse.9
15. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1707.
16. One is reminded of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the Court
held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination against
women, but a distinction based upon "an objectively identifiable physical condition
with unique characteristics." Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was subsequently
amended to provide specifically, 'The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex'
include . . . on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42
U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1994).
17. See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1707.
18. See id.
19. See id. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), was concerned with
an employer's motivation that included both legitimate and illegitimate considerations.
The Court concluded that no liability was attached if the employer could prove that
824 [Vol. 31:819
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4) If the employer's pension plan vested because of the age of
the employee, then discrimination because of the vesting would
be a form of age discrimination (e.g., a plan provides that re-
gardless of service years, pension vests at age sixty, or a combi-
nation of age and service years will result in pension vest-
ing).20
The one reservation, extremely relevant for the current dis-
cussion, was: "We have never decided whether a disparate im-
pact theory of liability is available under the ADEA, and we
need not do so here. 2'
I am inclined to take the word of the Court and not assume
that without argument the Court was silently extending the
implied criticisms drawn from a three justice concurrence, and
by this indirection implicitly resolve a major interpretative
issue.'
At least two courts of appeals, however, read between the
lines, ignored the Court's reservation, engaged in a scholastic
construction of the Hazen Paper language, and revisited estab-
lished authority to conclude that the ADEA requires proof of
motive, and thus impact cannot be a premise for ADEA liabili-
ty.' As three justices are anxious to address the issue, the
new division between circuits makes the issue ripe for Supreme
Court resolution. And if the Court acts, can Congress be far
behind?2
it would have made the same decision even absent the illegal motive. This holding
was overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
Now, an unlawful employment practice is established when a defendant is motivated
by race, color, religion, sex or national origin, even though other factors also motivat-
ed the practice.
20. See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1707.
21. Id. at 1706. Concurring, Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Thomas stated:
Nothing in the Court's opinions should be read as incorporating in the
ADEA context, the so-called "disparate impact" theory of Title VII * * *
There are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over dispa-
rate impact analysis from Title VII, to the ADEA. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1710 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996).
23. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); EEOC v.
Francis Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994). See also, Dibiase v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995) (dicta).
24. The Court construed ADEA language to permit an employer to force retire-
1997] 825
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III. THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE: PROS AND CONS OF THE IMPACT
ANALYSIS: INCONCLUSIVE?
The debate on whether impact analysis should be applied
under the ADEA has been well-framed over the past twenty
years.' These arguments can be categorized into three groups:
(1) textual language, (2) legislative history and (3) statutory
policies. Sound arguments are made on both sides, but appear,
in the abstract, to be inconclusive. At the end, however, I am
inclined to accept the premise that impact analysis should be
applicable, and I draw my conclusion from the unique language
of the defense found in section 4(f)(1). But first, a summary of
the traditional debate:
A. Textual Prohibition of Age Discrimination in Section 4(a)
Similar to the language of Title VII, the ADEA has two para-
graphs broadly proscribing age discrimination. The first para-
graph prohibits discrimination "because of such individual's
ment pursuant to its benefit system. This holding was revised by the 1978 Amend-
ments. The Court's holding that benefit distinctions under the ADEA need not be
based on actual cost differentials in providing those benefits, was revised by the Old-
er Worker Benefit Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)). And, of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
revised a host of Supreme Court decisions that conflicted with Congress' view of Title
VII.
25. Recent commentaries are helpful, and they are fairly divided on the issue.
Without being an exclusive list they include: Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker
Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in
Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX L. REV. 625 (1996); Steven J. Kaminshine, The
Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229 (1990); Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 WIS.
L. REv. 507 (1995); Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for Age Discrimination: Twi-
light of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1995); Michael D. Moberly, Reconsidering the
Discriminatory Motive Requirement in ADEA Disparate Treatment Cases, 24 N.M.L.
REV. 89 (1994); Palma Maria Forte, Comment, Is Silence Really Golden?: The Seventh
Circuit's Application of Disparate Impact to the ADEA, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 833 (1996);
Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What A Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact
Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C.L.
REV. 267 (1995). See particularly, Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that
Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093 (1993); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other than
Age Exception, 66 B.U.L. REV. 155 (1986).
826 [Vol. 31:819
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age."6 Those. opposed to impact analysis under the ADEA ar-
gue that it would take a linguistic stretch to read this phrase
to prohibit incidental or unintentional discrimination for any
reason other than age. In short, the language cries for motiva-
tion. True, and the Court's discussion in Hazen Paper hints of
difficulty.
Yet, the 4(a) language is identical to that found in Title
VI, 27 and since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court has read
this language to reach neutral selection devices that adversely
affect a protected class and are not justified by their relation-
ship to the job or job performance. And it is common that
where the ADEA and Title VH utilize similar language the two
statutes are to be similarly construed. Even when there are
differences in the precise wording of the two statutes, the Court
has given identical meaning to parallel sections of the stat-
utes.'
The second paragraph of Section 4(a) of the ADEA makes it
illegal "to limit, segregate or classify employees."' Title VII
has two words not found in the ADEA, "or applicants." Some
have read significance in this ambiguous omission of "appli-
cants," reasoning that impact analysis is primarily applicable to
persons seeking jobs, and thus the omission is pregnant with
implications that Congress intended to exclude impact concepts
of liability from the ADEA.
It is extremely doubtful that Congress had any active intent
on this matter. The ADEA was enacted in 1967, five years
before the concept of impact analysis was created in the Griggs
decision. Moreover, as impact analysis has been invoked under
Title VII in non-applicant situations,0 this omission may- be
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
28. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (BFOQ defense
under ADEA utilizes Title VII analysis even though there are some differences in the
wording of the two statutes); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1994).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1996) (language rules adversely affecting working
conditions of current employees); Watson v. Fort Worth -Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977
(1988) (subjective decision making applied to transfers and promotions); Daniels v.
Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union, 945 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1991) (union membership ter-
mination). County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), suggests strongly
that impact analysis is appropriate in pay discrimination cases. Cf. AFSCME v. State
19,971 827
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more of a drafting oversight than a conscious decision pregnant
with implication.
B. Legislative History
The preamble to the ADEA itself states that its purpose was
to prohibit "arbitrary age discrimination in employment."3 '
Some emphasize the word "arbitrary" to require motive. Howev-
er, Griggs itself, in creating impact analysis concepts, relied on
the notion that selection factors not related to job performance
which had an adverse effect on a protected class were "arbi-
trary" and thus in violation of Title VII. Moreover, the pream-
ble states as a purpose to "promote employment of older per-
sons on their ability rather than age."32 This too, suggests that
a practice that has no relationship to the "ability" of older
worker's could serve as a basis for liability when the challenged
practice adversely affects employment of older workers.
The opponents of impact analysis rely quite heavily on the
1965 Report from the Secretary of Labor.' That report served
as a basis for the ADEA itself. The Secretary's report identified
discrimination based on age or age stereotypes and recommend-
ed the statutory language now found in section 4(a) of the Act.
The report also identified issues and problems resulting from
factors that affect older workers more strongly than they affect
younger workers. The report suggested that factors that merely
affect older workers be addressed through programmatic mea-
sures designed to improve opportunities of older workers.
This "history" could be discounted as not being a true part of
the legislative process. Even if it is suggestive of subsequent
legislative intention, the report preceded any definitive con-
structions of Title VII language, and by about seven years pre-
ceded the concept of impact analysis first promulgated in
of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the "comparable worth" ap-
preach to pay discrimination based on an assumption that impact analysis did not
apply to subjective evaluation systems that go into compensation decisions).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1994).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
33. See W. WILLARD WIRTz, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, THE OLDER AimucN WORKER:
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CON-
GRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
828 [Vol. 31:819
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Griggs. Thus, since the report predated the concept, it is very
doubtful that the report either supports or rejects the idea that
liability under the proposed statute be based on the effect of
neutral practices.
Again, a much stronger history is that Congress adopted
language virtually identical to that previously used in Title VII
expressing an intent that where operative language of the stat-
utes was similar the two statutes were to be given similar
interpretation. Consequently, when similarly ambiguous
language under Title VII ultimately was construed by the
Supreme Court to encompass neutral practices that had an
unjustified adverse impact on a protected class, the legislature
may have intended that the ADEA should be given a parallel
construction.
C. Policy
Perhaps the strongest argument for not applying impact
analysis under the ADEA is the recognition that age is a class
fundamentally unlike the classes protected by Title VII. With
the possible exception of religion (where it remains unclear
whether impact analysis applies), classes protected by Title VII
are essentially immutable. Generally, a person does not with
time move from one gender to the next. They are born of a
particular race and with given ethnic origins.
Age, however, is a continuum. All persons of all races and
genders move through the age categories. No single age is par-
ticularly "suspect." Moreover, we probably have to accept the
premise that gradually, imperceptibly, certain abilities decrease
with age. But the rate and extent of decline differ from indi-
vidual to individual. Although there may be compensating in-
creases in other constructs (such as experience, wisdom, pa-
tience), in all cases those counterbalancing abilities are con-
stantly changing and vary with each individual. Congress must
have recognized this, and even if it did not, impact analysis
that works well with finite classes like race and sex does not
quite fit with a fluid, continuum concept such as age.
Because of the fluid, non-immutable nature of age, impact on
discrete age classes is much harder to isolate than it is on fixed
classes such as race or gender. For example, I suspect a device
1997] 829
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would rarely have a differential impact on those who are forty-
one years old compared to those who are thirty-nine. Compar-
ing impact on an age group consisting of persons between forty-
one and forty-six against a class of those between thirty-five
and forty might be slight, but still relatively insignificant. Per-
haps in comparing outcomes on those a fifteen-year age spread
(twenty-five through forty versus forty-one through fifty-six) for
the first time the device might demonstrate significant differen-
tial impact.
Now reconsider the test given by employer A, the time
scored, multiple choice test on scientific developments occurring
over the past ten years. One would guess that as a group youn-
ger persons (age twenty through forty) would perform at a
higher level than those in the fifty through seventy age class, if
for no other reason than familiarity with the testing format and
subject matter within the educational experiences of the two
age groups. Similarly, on the physical test given by employer B,
we might assume adroitness and strength demands ultimately
would have an adverse impact on an older age group whose
ultimate physical conditions would reduce relative performance
levels.
From this I am raising two related points: The first is the
difficulty in age cases of determining the class against which
impact can be measured; it is much fuzzier and more ill-defined
than in the classes pr6tected by Title VII.' Absent definitive
Congressional direction perhaps the courts should resist enter-
ing this thicket of uncertainty. Second, as we can assume that
at some point a very large number of otherwise rational stan-
dards ultimately will adversely affect some class of older work-
ers, the policy question we should ask is whether courts are
prepared to force employers to carry the burden of justifying
virtually all of their work and selection standards.35
34. For example, a particular practice has been shown to impact workers over the
age of 50, but has no impact on those between 40 and 50. Moreover, considering the
entire over-40 class, the practice does not impact this larger class when compared to
workers between 20 and 40. Held: No adverse impact. See Lowe v. Commack Union
Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989). Consider also a device that impacts
exclusively on those over 40. See Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, 967 F.2d 1161
(7th Cir. 1992).
35. See, e.g., Beith v. Nitrogen Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1983) (employer
discharged worker for having back problems, and it was asserted that such a practice
830 [Vol.-31:819
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On the other hand, motive is always vague and difficult for a
plaintiff to prove; no less difficult in age cases than it is in race
or sex discrimination under Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
was premised on that difficulty. Griggs created impact analysis
as an alternative for plaintiffs in situations where effect was
clear but proof that the employer intended the outcome was
elusive. The Court recognized that reliance solely on a
plaintiffs ability to prove invidious motivation for the
employer's action based upon ostensibly neutral evaluation
techniques would make it difficult to reach the systemic dis-
crimination that Congress was trying to remedy. The fable of
the fox and the stork recited by the Court in Griggs is equally
applicable to discrimination against older workers. A vessel
assuring protection agenst discrimination has been given, but
it is a vessel that has little value to the recipient.
As a final note, Title VII has long embraced impact analysis,
and the Americans with Disabilities Acte6 specifically recogniz-
es liability based on the effect of practices on qualified individu-
als with disabilities." It would be ironic if the only major
piece of employment discrimination legislation, the one protect-
ing against age discrimination, was construed not to reach
neutral practices. Could Congress have intended to treat age
differently than any other protected class and provide less pro-
tection to older workers than other protected groups? But Con-
gress did expressly provide for impact analysis in the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act. The silence in the ADEA thus may
have significance.
In the end both sides have good arguments. Perhaps the
"wisdom" of the Court ultimately will tell us which policy direc-
tion has the greatest pull. I submit, however, that regardless of
policy, the ADEA textually directs us to the result. The statute
itself provides a compromise between exclusive reliance on mo-
tive as a basis for liability and employers being denied use of
otherwise reasonable selection devices because of their inevita-
ble impact on older workers. Congress gave us language not
has an adverse impact on older workers).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
37. See 42 U.s.C § 12112(b)(3); McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir.
1992).
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found in Title VII which I believe virtually imposes a conclu-
sion, even more clearly than Title VII, that impact analysis is
appropriate under the ADEA, but in language that permits
employers to utilize reasonable selection devices notwithstand-
ing their impact on older workers.
IV. THE SECTION 4(F)(1) DEFENSE AND How IT DIRECTS
IMPACT ANALYSIS
Section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA provides that an employer may
take any action "otherwise prohibited where the differentiation
is based on reasonable factors other than age.""8
Note, this is a defense. It presupposes in structure and ex-
pressed language that the conduct has been "otherwise prohibit-
ed" by the terms of this Act. (This is to be contrasted with
cautionary proviso stating "nothing herein shall be construed to
prohibit."9 ) Therefore, we must look backward in the statute
to the textual prohibitions. This naturally takes us to section
4(a) of the Act."
As discussed earlier, and emphasized by those who reject an
implication of impact liability, section 4(a) prohibits discrimina-
tion "because of such individual's age," and this makes illegal
any age motivated distinctions against those in the protected
over forty age class. All such age motivated distinctions against
those over age forty are illegal.
The next step is to put sections 4(a) and 4(f)(1) together. If
age motivated the employer's action, section 4(a) establishes
prima facie liability. Now turning to section 4(f)(1); it allows the
action if the factor used is "reasonable" and "other than age."
There is no way section 4(f)(1) could ever have an application if
section 4(a) is limited to motivated decision making. If section
4(a) does not extend beyond age motivation, there would be no
need to have the 4(f)(1) defense because age motivated decisions
could not possibly be for reasons "other than age." The only
way for 4(f)(1) to have structural validity is to recognize that
38. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
39. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(i) and (j) as applied to preferences for Indians,
and preferential treatment based on work force imbalances under Title VII.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
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4(a) can be violated by non-age or age-neutral factors. At this
point, 4(f)(1) would allow the employer to establish the defense
that the challenged device was both neutral in terms of intent
and was "reasonable." The existence of section 4(f)(1) proves to
me that section 4(a) can be violated by employer actions not
motivated by age, and will in fact be violated if factors adverse-
ly affect the protected group and are not justified by the section
4(f)(1) defense. This logic is supported ,by two pillars. The first
is the old, well-established rule of statutory construction that if
one reading of a statute makes no sense or renders the provi-
sion redundant or superfluous, and an alternative reading gives
effect and meaning to the provision, the court should adopt the
reading that gives full meaning and effect to the statute. Again,
the only way section 4(f)(1) has any meaningful application is
for section 4(a) to proscribe actions that are not motivated by
age.
The second pillar of support is found in County of Washing-
ton v. Gunther.4' Ironically, cited by some as supporting a con-
clusion that the ADEA does not encompass impact analysis, I
read this case in fact to support, if not compel, a conclusion
that impact analysis must be recognized under the ADEA.
Working through this case can be a bit tedious.
Gunther was a Title VII case that involved a construction of
the so-called "Bennett Amendment." The Bennett Amendment
provides that no action will violate Title VII if that action is
"authorized" by the Equal Pay Act, a statute requiring equal
pay for men and women who perform work that it "equal."'
The Equal Pay Act has a defense that permits employers to
make pay differences based on any "factor other than sex."'
Note the similarity of the Equal Pay Act and ADEA "factor
other than . . ." defenses. Guess the origins of "factor other
than age" defense in the ADEA! Until the mid-1970s the Secre-
tary of Labor administered and enforced the Equal Pay Act.
The Secretary of Labor was charged by Congress in Title VII to
prepare a report on age discrimination and recommend legisla-
tion to Congress. The initial drafts of what 'eventually became
41. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
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the ADEA were thus prepared by the Secretary of Labor, and
this proposed statute contained the "reasonable factor other
than age" provision, a clause not found in Title VII, but found
in similar form as a defense in the Equal Pay Act. It would
seem, therefore, that the Secretary who was then enforcing the
Equal Pay Act, lifted language and concept from the Equal Pay
Act and placed it in the ADEA."
Back to Gunther. The plaintiffs were female prison guards.
They were asserting pay discrimination under Title VII because
of their sex based on the fact that male guards were receiving
higher compensation. There could be no violation of the Equal
Pay Act because the work of the male and female guards clear-
ly was not "equal" within the meaning of that Act.' Nonethe-
less, plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to proceed based
on potential evidence of illegal motivation behind the compen-
sation system. Defendant pleaded the Bennett Amendment and
argued therefrom that the pay difference for jobs not requiring
equal work was a difference "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act,
and being "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act, the pay difference
could not, as a matter of law, be a violation of Title VII.
The Court disagreed. It held that pay differences were "au-
thorized" by the Equal Pay Act only if a defense in the Equal
Pay Act justified their use.' Thus the mere fact that the work
being performed by male and female guards was not "equal"
within the meaning of the substantive prohibitions of the Equal
Pay Act did not preclude liability under Title VH. The short-
hand conclusion of the Court was that the Bennett Amendment
did nothing more than incorporate into Title VII the defenses
found in the Equal Pay Act; it did not impose on Title VII a
substantive standard of liability premised on plaintiff proving
equality of work.4'
44. An additional point, the Equal Pay Act does not require proof of motive, but
is violated by simple inequality of pay between men and women for work in an es-
tablishment that is "equal." The good faith of the employer in establishing the differ-
ence is no defense. This could suggest tlit the ADEA envisioned violations that were
not based on motive.
45. The male guards supervised more male inmates. The dangers and other
working conditions differed between male and female guards.
46. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168-71 (1981).
47. See id.
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The dissent argued that such a construction of the Bennett
Amendment rendered it meaningless." As Title VII prohibited
sex motivated compensation differences, the Equal Pay Act
defense authorizing differences based on any "factor other than
sex" would, according to the dissent, have no application. That
is, if sex motivated the pay difference, there could be no cir-
cumstance where the factor could possibly be "other than sex."
The majority rejoined this argument by pointing out that
since Title VII could apply to sex neutral systems that had an
adverse impact on a particular sex, and not just sexually moti-
vated decisions, the "factor other than sex" defense in the Equal
Pay Act, and incorporated into Title VII, would indeed have
continuing validity. It would apply to those sex neutral systems
that adversely affected one gender. If the employer utilized an
ostensible system to affix compensation, but the plaintiff proved
the adverse impact of that system on her gender, the employer
could avoid liability by proving the true sex neutrality of the
factors and that the system was a job related, rational "fac-
tor. 50 •
Although somewhat complex and difficult to see at first
glance, I suggest that Gunther is virtually controlling on this
issue. Indeed, it raises and answers an identical question cast
in a different statutory scheme. The similar "factor other
than... " defense was given meaning by the Gunther court
based on the assumption that the substantive prohibitions to
which it applied imposed liability premised on impact. If that is
true in this complex intersection of Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, it would seem equally true under ADEA, particularly given
the injunction that resolutions of Title VII language will be
given similar construction under the ADEA. The substantive
prohibitions of section 4(a) are clarified by the section 4(f)(1) defense.
48. See id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). Burden is on the
employer to establish one of the Equal Pay Act defenses, and that includes the bur-
den of proving the gender neutrality of the "factor" utilized. A "factor" which perpetu-
ates prior gender segregation by the employer is not sex neutral.
50. See, e.g., Brinkley-Obu v. Hughs Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1994);
Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992); Morgado v. Bir-
mingham-Jefferson County Civil Defense Corps, 706 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1983);
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
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So, the conclusion I reach is that the ADEA can be violated
through the use of elements, devices, or systems that have an
adverse impact on the protected age group.
Does this require the conclusion that the employer's burden
is to prove the "business necessity" of the device proved to
adversely affect older workers? I think the answer is no, and
the reason is again, that section 4(f)(1), a provision not found in
Title VII, sets a different standard for the defense under the
ADEA. Thus, while impact analysis is appropriate under the
ADEA, there is no transplant of the Title VII concept of busi-
ness necessity.
V. THE TITLE VII STANDARD: BACK ON WARDS COVE, AND
FORWARD TO THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: THE FALSE
DILEMMA FOR THE ADEA
Impact analysis as it evolved in a large number of Title VII
cases placed the burden on the plaintiff to identify the specific
device and prove that the device caused a significant adverse
impact on a protected class. Prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio5' the Court itself, and all of the lower court decisions,
uniformly placed the burden on the employer to establish the
"business necessity" of the challenged device. The courts were
unclear and inconsistent as to the meaning of "business necessi-
ty". Some suggested that a rather relaxed showing of 'job relat-
edness" would suffice. Others leaned toward requiring employ-
ers to prove something akin to true "necessity.""
Wards Cove Packing procedurally rewrote the assumption
that the burden was on the employer to prove the business
necessity of the device proven to have an adverse impact. It
held that the employer's burden was no more than that of pre-
senting evidence that the challenged device significantly served
a legitimate employer interest. The ultimate burden was on the
plaintiff to prove that the challenged device did not serve the
employer's business interests. Wards Cove Packing was also
51. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
52. For a summary of this division see, Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 841 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1988). See also, Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 16-23 (1989).
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seen by some as substantively diluting the content of "business
necessity." Although the Court emphasized that the employer's
reasons must be business related and that these ends must be
significantly served, the Court moved away from any suggestion
of "necessity" and utilized language that suggested mere "le-
gitimacy" would suffice to justify adverse impact.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 restored pre-Wards Cove analy-
sis,' but was silent on the application of this codification to
the ADEA. There are four possible constructions of this Con-
gressional inattention.
1. As impact analysis is now codified, and since the codifiers
made it applicable only to Title VII, and were silent as to im-
pact analysis under Title VII, there is no impact analysis under
the ADEA.M
2. For policy reasons, as well as general statutory language,
impact analysis is still appropriate under the ADEA. However,
Wards Cove Packing provides the definitive judicial construction
of the parallel language of Title VII. That construction would be
applicable to the ADEA unless statutorily modified. While it
was modified as applied to Title VII, it was not modified as
applied to the ADEA. 5 Thus, the ultimate burden is on the
plaintiff to prove lack of "business necessity" and "business
necessity" is akin to mere "business legitimacy."
3. Impact analysis as construed under Title VII is automati-
cally transferred to the ADEA. Unless the statutory language
53. First the Act defined "demonstrates" to mean "meets the burden of production
and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (1994). Then in defining liability the Act
makes it an unlawful employment practice if the complaining party demonstrates that
respondent uses a particular practice that causes a disparate impact on a protected
class and that the respondent "fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (1994).
54. This is not a bad argument, but Congress did not repeal sections 4(a) and
4(f)(1) of the ADEA, and as pointed out above, these provisions rather clearly imply
the viability of liability based on impact.
55. This also makes some sense, but it ignores the unique language of section
4(f)(1) which clearly makes the "reasonable factor other than age" a defense that
must be proved by the employer. Wards Cove-Packing was addressing language in
Title VII, and not the language unique to the ADEA. Wards Cove Packing cannot
deny the unique defense language of section 4(f)(1) that places the burden on the
employer.
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:819
indicates to the contrary, statutory clarifications to Title VII
seeking to correct a Court's misconstruction of existing statuto-
ry language must be applied to other statutory schemes relying
on the existing statutory language. Congress disapproved of the
Court's reading of the section 703(a) language of Title VII, upon
which section 4(a) of the ADEA was modeled. Thus, the statu-
tory "clarification" of section 703(a) applies to section 4(a) of the
ADEA. 56
4. "None of the above." I submit that the silence of the 1991
Civil Rights Act leaves the statutory language of ADEA unaf-
fected, and the language of the ADEA itself provides for impact
analysis wholly apart from the language of Title VII and the
construction given to Title VII language by Wards Cove Packing
and the amendments to Title VII in the 1991 Act. The language
of section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA not only allows for impact analy-
sis under section 4(a) of that Act, it also supplies the procedur-
al and substantive standard. Procedurally, it is a defense, and
as a defense, the burden is upon the employer to establish it.
Wards Cove Packing did not undermine this, and the 1991
Amendments do not address the ADEA. Substantively, the
section 4(f)(1) defense allows the employer to utilize any age
neutral factor that is "reasonable." The employer carries the
burden of proving true age neutrality, and age neutrality is not
established if the factor perpetuates prior discrimination or
segregation because of age.57 But the employer need not prove
that the challenged device is a true "business necessity." Its
burden is satisfied if the "factor" is proved to be "reasonable."
VI. THE 4(F)(1) STANDARD: WHAT IS A "REASONABLE" FACTOR?
Assuming that section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA frames the
employer's burden once the plaintiff proves that a particular
device has an adverse impact on the protected age class, the
question remains as to what must be considered a "reasonable
factor other than age"?
56. This, too, has some logic, but it also ignores the language of section 4(f)(1) of
the ADEA that is not present in Title VII.
57. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
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First, as it is structurally within the Act as a defense and
linguistically worded accordingly, the obligation of the employer
is to establish the element as a true defense. This means the
burden of both producing evidence and establishing its existence
rests upon the defendant, Wards Cove Packing notwithstanding.
Second, we know that "other than age" imposes on the em-
ployer the burden to prove total age neutrality. Thus disclaim-
ers two and three in Hazen Paper (age was the premise behind
the pension dismissal and dual motive for dismissal) would be a
burden on the defendant if the reason articulated for the dis-
missal was proved by plaintiff to impose an adverse impact on
the protected age group. We know from Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan' that neutral appearing systems (in that case day
and night shift pay differentials) perpetuate prior segregation
and if they do so they are no longer motive-neutral.
Third, we have to define "reasonable factor," a defense virtu-
ally unlitigated under the ADEA. The language and concept no
doubt was inspired by similar language found in the Equal Pay
Act "factor other than sex" defense, but with the addition of the
strengthening modifier "reasonable." Guidance as to what is
meant by "reasonable factor" under the ADEA therefore can be
found in the more extensive litigation concerning the "factor
other than sex" defense of the Equal Pay Act.
We can begin by assuming that a "factor" cannot be "reason-
able" if it is illegal. Illegality is the essence of unreasonable-
ness. Moreover, it would confound policy to allow an employer
to avoid liability by asserting as a defense that it acted illegal-
ly."9 "Reasonableness" presupposes basic bona fides. 60
58. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
59. Don't forget that motive is not an issue. Thus, while it is appropriate to ar-
gue that if the employer was motivated in a way other than what the particular
statute proscribed, the employer did not violate the statute at issue. That is the hold-
ing in Hazen Paper. However, in an impact case motive is not at issue. The focus is
on the legitimacy of using devices that are built in headwinds against employment of
members of a protected class. The plaintiff has proved that impact, and the employer
has the burden of establishing a true defense to conduct, that if not justified is ille-
gal. Thus, it would seem that illegal conduct should not serve as a defense to con-
duct that would otherwise be illegal.
60. The first step in tort law, for example, would be to determine whether con-
duct of an alleged tort feasor was itself legal or illegal. If the conduct was violation
of the law, it will be prima facie tortious.
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Reasonableness requires more than mere legality, but that
"something more" is not clear. The concept of reasonableness
comes in many hues. One shade implies little more than the
absence of irrationality. In short, the articulated reason is rea-
sonable if not totally arbitrary or capricious. On the other end
of the spectrum "reasonableness" suggests that the factor being
relied upon in fact meaningfully serves a significant employer
interest. If the employer's stated interest was only passing,
remote, or slight, or if the factor advancing that reason served
or supported the reason in only insubstantial or insignificant
ways, the factor would not be "reasonable." In short, "reason-
ableness" is a form of "business rationality." Such a heightened
sense of "reasonableness" would approach, but fall short of the
current definition of "business necessity" and would be far short
of any concept that the factor was "required" or "indispensable."
One could argue for any point along this spectrum, but I
suggest the starting place should be the definition supplied by
the courts that have construed the "factor other than sex" lan-
guage of the Equal Pay Act. But even here there is no agree-
ment on the meaning of "factor." One line of authority believes
that "factor" requires no more than a showing of general ratio-
nality. In short, the employer need prove that the "factor" is
not arbitrary. It must serve some lawful purpose, but it need
not serve any particular business purpose.6' Other authority
defines "factor" to presuppose an element that comes from the
unique characteristics of the job, from the individual's training,
experience, or unique abilities, or from the special exigent cir-
cumstances connected with the business." The employer
therefore must prove that the "factor" contains "business ratio-
nality."
The ADEA added the modifier "reasonable." At the very least,
it seems that Congress was contemplating an even stronger
61. See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988); Colby v. J.C.
Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873
(9th Cir. 1982). For example, providing employees who serve as the head of a house-
hold a pay premium might be rationally justified, but fall short of being related to a
business need of the employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.21 (1996).
62. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992); Glenn
v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571, n.9 (11th Cir. 1988). The EEOC ap-
pears to take the "business purpose" aspect of "factor." 29 C.F.R. § 1620.21 (1996).
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version of "factor" than might emerge from the unmodified term
"factor" found in the Equal Pay Act. Thus, while "reasonable
factor other than age" seems less demanding than "essential" or
"necessary" for the employer's business, .reasonable factor"
presupposes something more meaningful than abstract rationali-
ty. Parsing the exact formulation of that concept can wait. For
now we can rest on the notion that "reasonable factor" requires
an employer to prove a heightened form of reasonableness that
relates to "business rationality."
A return to the two employment tests hypothesized at the
beginning of these remarks could illustrate the broad parame-
ters for the "business rationality" idea. Assume plaintiff has
proved the impact of the pen and paper, scientific knowledge
test "A." Assume the test was used to select police officers,
firefighters, and bus drivers. Absent some unforeseen predictive
validity,' as the content at best is remotely related to any of
these jobs, the employer would be unable to carry the burden of
proving that the device was a "reasonable factor." On the other
hand, if a correlation between job and test performance could
be established, or if the job required current knowledge of these
areas, as might be the case in for high school science teachers,
the test might be a "reasonable factor" even if it did not pass
the more stringent validation required of "business necessity"
under Title VII.
Similarly, if the physical performance test "B" was used to
select computer programmers or science teachers, absent unlike-
ly predictive validity of the test, the test would seem to lack
"reasonableness." Such a test is probably lawful, and it is ab-
stractly reasonable (or not unreasonable) to have extremely fit
employees. Nonetheless, a physical test for largely sedentary
jobs seems to lack a job relationship that would meet the stan-
dard of "reasonableness." However, if the employer were select-
ing police officers or firefighters, the test might have sufficient
content validity to justify its use as "reasonable," even if the
test did not meet the more stringent validation demands of the
Title VII concept of "business necessity.""
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1996); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975).
64. See LeGauilt v. Arusso, 842 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.H. 1994); Police Officers for
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION BY WAY OF
APPLICATION TO PAST CASES
By way of final summary let us hypothesize the application
of the proposed "business rationality" standard to three of the
recent cases.
A. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins"
To prove impact, a plaintiff would have the burden of demon-
strating that the employer's practice of terminating those whose
pensions were about to vest adversely affected those over the
age of forty. As ten years were required for vesting, it is con-
ceivable that with a larger employer such a practice might be
proven to have adversely affected workers in the over forty age
class."6
The burden section 4(f)(1) then imposes on the employer
would be to prove that the system of dismissal for pension
vesting was a "reasonable factor other than age." The Hazen
Court has held that pension vesting, on its face, is age neutral.
Whether or not we agree with this conclusion, we must now
accept that the "factor" is "other than age." The question re-
mains whether pension vesting as a premise for discharge is a
"reasonable factor"? The Court virtually conceded that the
employer's action violated ERISA, a federal statute regulating
pension rights. Assuming unlawful cannot be "reasonable," it
would seem that the employer could not establish the "reason-
ableness" of using pension vesting as a condition of em-
ployment.
B. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School 7
The employer, a school, would not hire experienced persons
because with experience the teacher would expect more salary.
Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 916 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1990).
65. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
66. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (subjective
practices appeared to be affecting the individual black plaintiff and the Court allowed
impact analysis to be utilized).
67. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Thus, inexperienced persons were used to fill vacancies as a
cost-saving device. This court refused to apply impact analysis.
Hazen Paper seems to make clear that utilizing relative expe-
rience to allocate jobs or benefits is not per se "age." Experience
and age are conceptually distinct, even though both involve
passage of time. However, it seems possible that a plaintiff
could demonstrate through the employer's actual experience
with the policy or other statistical methodologies that preferring
the non-experienced over the experienced adversely affects indi-
viduals over the age of forty. Section 4(f)(1) would shift the bur-
den to the employer to prove that "lack of experience" is a "rea-
sonable factor other than age."
Unlike pension vesting, "lack of experience" would seem to be
otherwise lawful. However, lack of experience does not relate to
ability to do the job. Indeed, if one believes that more experi-
ence makes one more qualified, the relationship between "lack
of experience" and job performance is probably converse.
However, the articulated basis for using experience as a fac-
tor was "saving money." Economic efficiency in terms of salary
savings may or may not be "reasonable," depending upon one's
view of "business rationality." The EEOC suggests that saving
money cannot justify such a distinction.' However, relative
salary demands of competing employees has been considered a
reasonable factor in determining which employees to hire or lay
off.6" It is business-related to hire the most cost efficient work-
ers, and while not a "business necessity" except in the most
extreme cases, it may well be considered "reasonable." Perhaps
employers should be free to engage in a cost-benefit analysis to
determine if the marginal value of experienced workers is equal
68. See 29 C.F.YR § 1625.7 (1996).
69. See Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1990); EEOC v.
Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d. 434 (8th Cir. 1989). Compare EEOC v.
Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984) which permitted relative salaries to be
used in allocating lay offs but only if "necessary" to avoid liquidation of the company.
This court applied a variation on the concept of "business necessity," but did so in
the context of an assumption, now erroneous, that use of relative salary was essen-
tially a facial form of "age" discrimination that the employer could justify only under
extraordinary circumstances such as the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification defense
or, in this case, a constructed "failing business" concept of "necessity."
1997] 843
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to the increased cost of hiring those with experience. In short,
economic efficiency of an employer may be "reasonable."
So, it is entirely possible that the outcome of Francis Parker
School in favor of the employer would have been the same even
if impact analysis had been applied. Rather than rejecting im-
pact analysis as a concept, the court might well have found
that the employer's system, even if it had an adverse impact,
was a "reasonable factor." Was it fear of impact analysis that
kept it from making that step?
C. Ellis v. United Airlines 0
This employer utilized weight maxima that appeared to re-
sult in older flight attendants being denied employment at rates
higher than younger flight attendants. The court refused to
consider impact analysis as a basis for liability.
We might assume that this plaintiff could have established
the impact of the weight rule. Nonetheless, it might not be
terribly difficult to establish a reasonable business need for
general and facially reasonable weight limit for airline flight
personnel even though the rule could not be justified as being a
"business necessity." If so, and it seems likely, the employer,
Ellis, would have prevailed even if the court had recognized
impact analysis.
If one reads between the lines, judicial fear that impact anal-
ysis would be tantamount to imposing liability on the employer
may have caused the two leading cases that rejected impact
analysis to take this action. This leads me to a final conclusion.
It may be the fear of impact analysis with its intimidating
specter of "business necessity" that is leading some courts to
jump to the conclusion that the impact concept must be rejected
or employers will face unacceptable levels of liability for follow-
ing common and reasonable selection systems. It is an unfound-
ed fear.
Recognition of impact analysis under the ADEA is necessary
to provide significant protection for older workers against irra-
70. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
844 [Vol. 31:819
1997] IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER THE ADEA 845
tional systems that effectively deny them employment opportu-
nities that fail to serve legitimate employer needs. At the same
time, as the ADEA section 4(f)(1) defense allows employers to
utilize "reasonable factors" employers retain sufficient autonomy
to rationally operate their businesses.

